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SUMMARY 
ELDREDGE V. CARPENTERS' 46 NORTHERN 
CALIFORINA COUNTIES JOINT 
APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING COMMITTEE: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT FINALLY HAMMERS 
THE CARPENTERS' UNION WITH AN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties 
Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee,l the Ninth Circuit· 
held that affirmative action2 was the proper remedy for de-
1. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship Training 
Committee, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (per Fletcher, J., joined by Reinhardt, J., 
and Kozinski, J.) ("Eldredge VI"). 
2. The United States Department of Labor Guidelines define "afUrmative 
action" as: 
Affirmative action is not mere passive nondiscrimination. 
It includes procedures, methods, and programs for the 
identification, positive recruitment, training, and motiva-
tion of present and potential minority and female (minori-
ty and nonminority) apprentices utilizing the establish-
ment of goals and timetables. It is action which will 
equalize opportunity in apprenticeship as to allow full 
utilization of the work potential of minorities and women. 
The overall result to be sought is equal opportunity for 
all individuals participating in or seeking entrance to the 
Nation's labor force. 
29 C.F.R. § 30.4(b) (1996). See David B. Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative 
Action, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 926 (1996). Afflrmative action refers to 
"race- and gender-conscious practices[.]" [d. 
91 
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cades3 of Title VII violations by the Carpenters 46 Northern 
California Counties Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee 
(hereinafter "the JATC").4 The court found that a plan which 
increased opportunities for women was necessary to dissipate 
the adverse effects of a selection process which had had a dis-
parate impact on female applicants to the JATC's carpentry 
apprenticeship program.5 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in-
structed the district court to enjoin the JATC's further use of 
the so-called "hunting license"s system, discounting the JATC's 
arguments that the system was a business necessity.7 The 
court pointed out that the JATC's own numerical referral list 
system was available as an alternative, less discriminatory, 
practice.s The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court 
had abused its discretion in adopting a remedy which had 
simply eliminated the "first-job requirement" for female appli-
cants.9 The court found that such a remedy was both unlawful 
and inadequate since it could not rectify the JATC's past dis-
crimination and had denied female applicants the skills neces-
sary for success in the carpentry trade. 10 
3. The affirmative action plan is the result of 21 years of litigation between 
the parties. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367. Plaintiff Linda Eldredge filed her law-
suit against the JATC in September of 1975 in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Coun-
ties JATC, 440 F. Supp. 506, 509 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("Eldredge I"). The case has 
gone through two appeals and subsequent remands. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367. 
The Plaintiff Class noticed its third appeal to the Ninth Circuit in 1993. 
Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties 
JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925). The Ninth Circuit issued its deci-
sion in September of 1996, 21 years after Plaintiff Linda Eldredge had filed her 
gender discrimination case. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1366-67. See discussion infra 
part II.B. 
4. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1371. 
5. Id. 
6. A "hunting license" is a slang term for the letter of subscription issued by 
the JATC to its apprenticeship program applicants. The hunting license allowed 
the applicant to seek employment on his or her own. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at 
512. 
7. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1369. 
10. Id. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/8
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 93 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Over the past two decades, a number of women have ap-
plied for admission to the JATC apprenticeship program but 
have found it difficult to meet the so-called "first-job require-
ment."ll Previously, the Ninth Circuit had found that this 
inability to gain admission was due to the discriminatory pro-
cedures used by the JATC to select its apprentices. 12 Despite 
extensive litigation, however, the number of female applicants 
admitted to the program has remained relatively low in com-
parison to male applicants.13 
A. THE JATC CARPENTRY APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAM 
The JATC is a joint-labor-management committee created 
by a 1963 collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the 
"Trust Agreement") between various Northern California car-
pentry contractors' associations14 and local unions of the Unit-
ed Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (com-
monly known as the "AFL-CIO").15 The Trust Agreement re-
quired the JATC's Board of Trustees16 to establish a carpen-
11. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366, 1368 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Eldredge VI"). 
12. [d. 
13. [d. at 1367. In August 1996, there were 191 female apprentices in the 
JATC's program. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at Exh. 3, Eldredge v. Carpen-
ters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925). See 
discussion infra part lILA. 
14. Signatory employer associations included the Building Industry Association 
of Northern California, the Sacramento Building Industry Association, the Engi-
neering & Grading Contractors Association, the California Contractors Council, 
Inc., the Associated General Contractors of California, and the Bay Counties Area 
General Contractors Association. Appellee's Brief at i, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 
No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 917 (1982). 
15. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 440 F. Supp 506, 510 
(N.D. Cal. 1977) ("Eldredge I"). 
16. The fourteen members of the Board of Trustees are selected as follows: the 
Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties' Conference Board appoints seven 
members, the Associated General Contractors of California (hereinafter "AGC") 
appoints three members, the Northern California Home Builders Conference (here-
inafter "NCHBC") appoints three members, and the AGC and the NCHBC appoint 
one member at-large. Appellee's Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. 
Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
917 (1982). 
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try apprentice training program in the various Northern Cali-
fornia counties. 17 To fulfill its obligation, the JATC estab-
lished a four-year carpentry apprenticeship program which 
allowed participants to attain journeyman status18 after com-
pleting a classroom training program and gaining some on-the-
job experience.19 The development and coordination of the 
classroom instruction program to supplement the requisite job 
experience was the JATC's central focus. 2o To qualify for ad-
mission to the apprenticeship program, applicants had to meet 
minimal age and education requirements and had to find a 
"first job" in the carpentry trade.21 
Applicants could satisfy the first-job requirement by utiliz-
ing either one or both of the following authorized means: (1) a 
numerical referral list system22 and (2) a hunting license sys-
17. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 510. The Trust Agreement provides, in part, 
with respect to the JATC's duties: 
The Board of Trustees shall have the power and duty to 
administer the Fund, to establish, support or maintain 
Programs, and payout the assets of the Fund for the 
purpose of educating and training persons as journeymen 
or apprentices in all classifications covered by any Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement, to the end that there shall 
be an adequate supply of educated and skilled journeymen 
available to man the jobs of Individual Employers. 
Appellee's Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 
534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982). The Trust 
Agreement also states that the various parties are to be bound by the JATC's 
construction of the agreement. Brief of Appellants at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 
No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 917 (1982). 
18. A journeyman is defined as: "A workman who is thoroughly qualified in a 
trade, having passed through an Apprenticeship, and who earns the prevailing 
standard wage for the trade." ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF BUILDING AND CON-
STRUCTION TERMS 225 (1976) (Emphasis in original). 
19. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 510-11. 
20. Appellee's Brief at 6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 
662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982). The 
four year program required apprentices to undergo 576 hours of classroom instruc-
tion and 6,200 hours of on-the-job experience. Id. 
21. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at 511. The applicants had to be at least 17 
years old and have either a high school diploma or a general education diploma. 
Id. 
22. Placement on the numerical referral list was accomplished by submitting 
an application to the local JATC office and receiving, in turn, an applicant num-
ber. The order of placement was determined according to the order applications 
were received. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. 
Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925). 
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tem.23 Under the numerical referral list system, an applicant 
would simply await job referrals from the local JATC office 
distributed according to the applicant's ranking on a numerical 
referral list of applicants,24 whereas under the hunting license 
system, the applicant was required to seek his or her own 
employment independently. 25 
Upon meeting the first-job requirement, the applicant was 
allowed to sign an indenture agreement with the local JATC 
office.26 This indenture agreement also allowed the applicant 
to apply for membership with his or her local carpenters' un-
ion.27 After executing the indenture agreement, the applicant 
became an indentured apprentice and was eligible to enter the 
classroom training program.28 
B. ELDREDGE'S ALLEGATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION 
Linda Eldredge brought this suit on behalf of all female 
applicants to the JATC program who had been denied admis-
sion because of the JATC's hunting license system.29 Eldredge 
first became aware of a potential problem when she applied to 
the JATC's carpentry apprenticeship program in August of 
1975.30 Although Eldredge had waited outside the San Fran-
cisco JATC office hours ahead of time hoping to obtain a high 
23. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368. 
24. Id. In this instance, the employer would call the union dispatcher to re-
quest an unspecified beginning apprentice. The union dispatcher would then con-
tact the JATC and the JATC would dispatch the applicant ranked highest on the 
numerical referral list. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512. 
25. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368. Typically, the applicant would seek employ-
ment from potential employers, by presenting his or her hunting license. If the 
contractor decided to hire that applicant as a beginning apprentice for at least 
sixty days, the contractor would sign the hunting license which the applicant re-
turned to the local JATC office. The employer would then contact the union dis-
patcher and request that applicant by name. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512. 
26. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 511. 
27. Id. Even if the indentured apprentice should happen to lose his or her job 
only one day after signing the indenture agreement, his or her indenture status 
would remain intact. Appellants' Brief at 5-6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. 
Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2846), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 
1210 (1988). 
28. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 511. 
29. Id. at 510 n.l. 
30. Id. at 512. 
5
Aholelei-Aonga: Affirmative Action
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
96 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:91 
placement on the JATC numerical referral list, she was yet 
unable to gain admission because of alleged discriminatory 
practices.31 She had been under the impression that the JATC 
numerical referral list system was an easier way of fulfilling 
the first-job requirement than the hunting license system since 
"it did not require a new applicant to [already] have connec-
tions in the trade.,,32 In reality, however, employers had only 
intermittently used the numerical referral list system, instead 
relying almost entirely upon the hunting license system.33 
Although Eldredge had received her hunting license and 
had been given a place on the numerical referral list, initially 
she had believed that the JATC had discriminated against her 
and other female applicants because she had been denied 
equal placement on the referrallist.34 Consequently, Eldredge 
filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (hereinafter "EEOC") charging the JATC with gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (hereinafter "Title VII,,).35 
In support of her claim, Eldredge alleged two specific in-
stances of gender discrimination.36 First, she contended that, 
because she was a woman, the Apprenticeship Coordinator for 
the San Francisco JATC office had evaded answering her ques-
tions regarding placement on the numerical referral list and 
the process for receiving subsequent referrals.37 Second, she 
31. Id. at 512-13. 
32. Appellants' Brief at 7-8 n.2, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties 
JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 
(1982). 
33. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
34. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512-13. 
35. Id. at 513. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any em-
ployer, labor organization, or joint labor-management com-
mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or em-
ployment in, any program established to provide appren-
ticeship or other training. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1995). 
36. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 513. 
37. Id. 
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asserted that a JATC official had given a woman who had been 
first in line at the San Francisco JATC office the number two 
appointment Slip38 instead of the number one appointment 
Slip.39 Although the JATC official had later corrected the mis-
take at the woman's request, the official had also required the 
woman to sign on a long strip of tape placed over the number 
one spot.40 
One month later, Eldredge requested and received a 
"right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC.41 She immediately filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California alleging that her experience at the JATC's 
San Francisco office had constituted gender discrimination!2 
Initially, the district court had dismissed the action for non-
joinder of indispensable parties,43 reasoning that the individu-
38. An "appointment slip" is synonymous with an "applicant number." See 
supra note 22. 
39. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 513. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. Upon receipt of Eldredge's complaint, the EEOC initially referred 
Eldredge to the California Fair Employment Practice Commission (hereinafter 
"FEPC") recommending the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the JATC. 
The FEPC declined to process the charges, however, and sent the case back to the 
EEOC. The EEOC then issued Eldredge a right-to-sue letter stating that it was 
unable to "investigate, conciliate or file suit" within the 180 day period required 
by statute. Id. 
Because Title VII prohibits an aggrieved party from suing an employer 
without the permission of the EEOC, a person must first obtain a "right-to-sue" 
letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(1) (1995). A "right-to-sue" letter is a 
written authorization by the EEOC that allows the complainant to commence a 
legal action against an employer. The EEOC will issue such a letter under any 
one of the following circumstances: (1) if the EEOC finds it does not have jurisdic-
tion or other administrative reasons; (2) if the Plaintiff requests the letter before 
the administrative process is complete, and the EEOC, in its discretion, decides to 
issue the letter; (3) if the EEOC finds that there is no reasonable cause; or (4) if 
the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause and no conciliation has been 
reached, and the EEOC has determined that it will not itself bring suit. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28 (1996). 
42. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at 513. During the pendency of her legal action, 
Eldredge awaited job referrals from the JATC but had not attempted to use her 
hunting license to find a job on her own. After receiving information from the 
JATC that a large number of applicants had found their own jobs, however, 
Eldredge tried unsuccessfully to do the same. Consequently, Eldredge amended her 
complaint to allege that the JATC's hunting license system had had a disparate 
impact on female applicants. Id. at 514. 
43. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 19 allows a court to dismiss an 
action for failure to join a party if 
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be ac-
7
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al employers were indispensable parties that must be joined 
and that Eldredge had failed to comply with its earlier order to 
join the employers." The Ninth Circuit reversed and remand-
ed, finding that the absent employers' interests would not be 
impaired since the employers had ceded their interests in the 
apprenticeship program selection process to the JATC.45 The 
court reasoned that interested employers could intervene if 
they so desired.46 
On remand, Eldredge requested the district court to certify 
a class which included all female applicants who had unsuc-
cessfully applied to the JATC's program (hereinafter "the 
Plaintiff Class").47 Although the court certified the class, the 
court also granted summary judgment in the JATC's favor 
holding that the JATC could not be liable for the employers' 
discrimination as a matter of law.48 Again, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the JATC's 
hunting license system had had a disparate impact on female 
applicants to the program and therefore was a prima facie 
violation of Title VII. 49 In reaching its decision, the court re-
viewed statistical data which showed that a much smaller 
percentage of female applicants had been admitted to the pro-
corded among those already parties, or (2) the person 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to sub-
stantial risks of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
FED. R. CN. P. 19. 
44. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 83 F.R.D. 136 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979). 
45. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982) ("Eldredge II"). See supra note 17. 
46. [d. 
47. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Coun-
ties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2846), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 
1210 (1988). 
48. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 149, 151 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
49. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988) ("Eldredge IV"). Because the JATC 
had failed to show that the system was a business necessity, the court determined 
that the Plaintiff Class was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. [d. 
at 1341. 
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gram than male applicants. 50 The Ninth Circuit instructed the 
district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Plain-
tiff Class and to hold a trial to determine the appropriate rem-
edy.51 Unfortunately for the Plaintiff Class, the district court 
adopted a remedy which simply exempted women from the 
first-job requirement and did not impose any affirmative obli-
gation on the JATC to admit women to the program. 52 The 
Plaintiff Class again appealed the district court's ruling to the 
Ninth Circuit.53 This time, the appellate court not only re-
versed the court below but also issued an opinion which in-
structed the district court to adopt an affirmative action plan, 
to appoint a monitor to oversee its implementation, and to 
enjoin the further use of the hunting license system.54 This 
third appellate decision is the subject of this article. 
III. BACKGROUND 
Women who have entered the carpentry trade and other 
male-dominated occupations have encountered discrimination 
from employers and labor unions.55 Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act creates a statutory framework which prohibits em-
50. Id. at 1339. 
51. Id. at 1341. 
52. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1993) (order granting injunctive relieO ("Eldredge V"). The 
Plaintiff Class proposed (1) that the JATC eliminate the hunting license system 
and require the use of only the numerical referral list system; (2) an affirmative 
action plan that mandated the referral of one woman for every four men sent to 
job referrals from the numerical referral list; (3) the appointment of a monitor to 
oversee the implementation of the affirmative action plan; and (4) other specific 
relief to increase the success rate of women in the carpentry trade. Id. In con-
trast, the JATC proposed a two-track system in which female applicants no longer 
needed to meet the first-job requirement while male applicants were still required 
to secure employment prior to admission into the program. Thus, female applicants 
would be allowed to enter the JATC program without a confirmed job offer. Under 
this proposal, the JATC sought to avoid the complete elimination of the hunting 
license system. Id. Shortly after trial and before the issuance of the court's order, 
the JATC informed the court that it had unilaterally implemented its proposal. 
Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties 
JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925). 
53. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367. 
54. Id. at 1369-72 . 
. 55. See JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PuBLIC POLI-
CIES 265-87 (Sharon L. Harlan and Ronnie J. Steinberg eds., 1989) (hereinafter 
"JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN") for a discussion of the inequities that prevent women 
from obtaining nontraditional employment. 
9
Aholelei-Aonga: Affirmative Action
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:91 
ployer practices that either classify or have a discriminatory 
effect on certain protected groups, including those based on 
gender, race, religion, color or national origin.56 Title VII also 
provides a basis for evaluating and remedying certain discrimi-
natory employment practices. 57 Once employment discrimina-
tion is shown, Title VII provides for such remedies as injunc-
tions, back pay, reinstatement, attorney's fees and other relief 
which the district court may deem appropriate.58 
A. WOMEN IN THE CARPENTRY TRADE 
Traditionally, the carpentry trade, as with most construc-
tion industry jobs, has been closed to women. 59 This is appar-
ent in the number of women actually employed in the trade.60 
In 1975, female carpenters comprised only 10 percent of car-
penters nationwide.61 A decade later, about another 8,700 fe-
male carpenters had entered the trade, increasing the percent-
age of women to about 12 percent.62 By 1995, female carpen-
ters still accounted for only 12 percent even though an addi-
tional 8,000 women had entered the trade.63 The most recent 
figures available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that 
in November 1996 women accounted for only 11 percent of all 
carpenters despite the infiltration of the trade by another 
2,000 women. 54 Thus, although the number of women enter-
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (1995). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1995). 
59. MARy L. WALSHOK, BWE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRON-
TIER 5 (1981); JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 269. 
60. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. The number of women admit-
ted to apprenticeship programs has also remained low. JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN, 
supra note 55, at 277. In July 1968, the U.S. Bureau of Apprenticeship and Train-
ing reported that out of 77,151 total construction apprentices nationwide, there 
were only two female apprentices; three years later, there were only five. [d. That 
number increased to 3,198 by 1975 and again to 13,279 in 1979. [d. at 278 tbl. 
1~~ . 
61. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. There were a total of 102,500 
carpenters nationwide; 10,300 women and 92,200 men. [d. 
62. See id. Carpenters nationwide totaled 154,700; male carpenters numbered 
135,700 and female carpenters, 19,900. [d. 
63. See id. In 1995, there was 225,000 carpenters nationwide; 195,700 men 
and 27,300 women. [d. 
64. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau 
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ing the carpentry trade has more than tripled over the past 
two decades, their overall percentages still pale in comparison 
to the men's numbers.65 
Contrary to the general trend in the trade, the actual 
number of women in the JATC's carpentry apprenticeship 
program has remained relatively low.66 Between 1975 and 
1984, while approximately 39 percent of male applicants had 
gained admission to the program, less than 21 percent of fe-
male applicants had also entered the program.67 This resulted 
in women constituting less than 3 percent of the JATC's pro-
gram participants.68 Similarly, between 1985 and 1990, more 
than 56 percent of all male applicants were admitted to the 
JATC's program, as compared with less than 23 percent of 
female applicants.69 Again, women accounted for less than 3 
percent of the JATC's apprentices between 1985 and 1990.70 
According to the most recent figure available, in August 1996 
the number of women in the JATC's program had decreased to 
191.71 Thus, the actual number of women in the JATC's pro-
gram has steadily decreased in the past two decades.72 
Despite the s~ow movement of women into the carpentry 
trade and other "nontraditional,,73 occupations, women contin-
of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. There were 227,900 male 
carpenters and 29,600 female carpenters, totaling 257,500 carpenters nationwide. 
Id. 
65. See id. 
66. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.2d 1366, 1368· 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Eldredge VI"). 
67. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10 n.8, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. 
Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925). 
68. See id. There had been 54,344 male applicants and 3,140 female applicants 
to the program between 1975 and 1984. The actual number of women admitted 
during this time period was 657. Id. 
69. Id. at 11. A total of 1,333 women had applied to the program in addition 
to 19,655 men. Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated the percentage of 
men admitted as 48 percent, however, that number should be 56 percent. Id. 
70. See id. at 10. 306 women had successfully gained admission during this 
five year period, 1985-1990. Id. 
71. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at Exh. 3, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. 
Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925). At the same 
time, male apprentices numbered 2,308. Id. 
72. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368. 
73. "Nontraditional" jobs generally refer to fields or occupations traditionally 
held by men, such as plumber, carpenter, electrician and bricklayer. See JOB 
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ue to seek such jobs for two main reasons.74 First, these jobs 
generally offer reasonable wages and benefits due to the high 
level of skill required.75 Second, many women find working in 
traditionally male occupations both rewarding and well-suited 
to their talents.76 However, gender discrimination in the form 
of employer practices remains a barrier for the women who 
desire to make carpentry, or other nontraditional jobs, their 
chosen occupation.77 
B. GENDER DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196478 is one of the 
main statutory bases for remedying gender discrimination in 
employment.79 Specifically, Title VII prohibits discriminatory 
acts, policies or practices by an employer against any person or 
group based on race, sex, color, national origin, or religion.80 
TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 265. 
74. See Sylvia A. Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers"-Affirmative Action for Wom-
en in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. fu:'!. 45, 48 
(1989). 
75. Law, supra note 74, at 48. Professor Law sunnises that most women enter 
the construction field because it pays more than female-dominated jobs such as 
secretarial work. 1d. The following example illustrates this point. In 1992, a car-
penter earned a median weekly income of approximately $425 per week, while 
female-dominated jobs such as secretary and hair dresser paid much less: $373 per 
week and $260 per week, respectively. Kathleen Green, Should You Build a Fu-
ture as a Construction Tradeswoman?, 37.ocCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK QUARTERLY 2, 5 
(1993). 
76. Law, supra note 74, at 48-49; Green, supra note 75, at 3. 
77. JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 270, 286. See Green, supra 
note 75, at 7. 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1995). 
79. BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAw 1 (2d. ed., 1983). 
80. Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classifY his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
12
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Title VII applies to private employers with fifteen or more 
employees, public and private education institutions, labor 
organizations, and federal, state and local agencies.sl 
Under Title VII, a plaintiff may have two theories of liabil-
ity upon which he or she may proceed against an employer.s2 
First, a plaintiff may allege intentional disparate treatment by 
an employer.s3 In this instance, the employer intentionally 
mistreats the employee because of the employee's gender, or 
other protected classification.s4 The second theory, disparate 
impact, occurs when an employer practice adversely impacts a 
protected groUp.85 
Briefly, both theories of liability have essentially the same 
framework, with the exception of a showing of discriminatory 
intent in disparate treatment cases.86 In alleging disparate 
treatment, the plaintiff must initially make out a prima facie 
case.87 The burden then shifts to the employer to show a legit-
imate or nondiscriminatory purpose for its actions.88 If the 
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show that 
the proffered legitimate reason is only a pretext for discrimina-
tion.89 
Similarly, in cases alleging disparate impact, the plaintiff 
must also establish a prima facie case of discrimination.90 Un-
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1995). 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (k) (1995). "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also [employment] practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding 
that company's facially neutral employment requirements disparately impacted 
African-American workers). 
83. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n.15 (1977) ("Teamsters") (holding that intentional discrimination by the union in 
treating minority workers less favorably than whites violated Title VII). 
84. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
85. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
86. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
87. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972) (holding that 
a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case may rebut an employer's proffered legiti-
mate reason by proving that it is but a pretext for intentional discrimination). 
88. [d. at 802. 
89. [d. at 804. 
90. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1976) (holding that neutral 
13
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like disparate treatment cases, however, the plaintiff need not 
prove discriminatory intent.91 Instead, the plaintiff is required 
to prove only that an employer practice adversely affected a 
protected classification.92 The burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to justify the practice or policy as a business necessi-
ty.93 Business necessity means only that an employer practice 
has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question,,94 
or is "necessary to safe and efficient job performance.,,95 If the 
employer successfully meets the business necessity burden, 
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer's interests may still be met by an alternative practice 
that would not have such an adverse effect.96 In either case, if 
the plaintiff prevails, he or she is entitled to the remedies 
provided by Title VIL97 
C. COURT-ORDERED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS AS REMEDIES 
FOR TITLE VII VIOLATIONS 
Title VII provides explicit remedial measures which the 
courts may impose on the employer in the event of proven 
violations.98 Courts have further interpreted Title VII to grant 
district courts broad discretion in constructing the most com-
prehensive relief possible.99 Thus, a wide range of relief is 
height and weight requirements are valid as bona fide occupational qualifications 
despite having had a disparate impact on female applicants). 
91. [d. at 328. 
92. [d. at 329. Title VII requires the removal of arbitrary and unnecessary 
barriers that operate to discriminate against a protected class. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
431. 
93. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. 
94. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
95. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14. 
96. [d. at 329. 
97. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1995). 
98. Title VII provides: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged . . . in an unlawful employment practice . . . , 
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in 
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affir-
mative action as may be appropriate, which may include, 
but it is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without backpay . . . , or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate. 
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1995). 
99. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364; Equal Employment Oppt'y Comm'n v. Ford, 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/8
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 105 
available to plaintiffs under Title VII, which may include rein-
statement, back pay, attorney's fees, injunctions or affirmative 
action plans. loo The courts have held that injunctive relief 
may be appropriate where the discriminatory employer prac-
tice was not justified as a business necessity.lol However, ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court, the issuance of 
affirmative action as a remedy requires, among other things, a 
finding of pervasive and long-standing discrimination by the 
employer. 102 
The Supreme Court initially reviewed the appropriateness 
of affirmative action as a Title VII remedy in Local 28 of Sheet 
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC (hereinafter "Sheet Metal 
Workers").103 The Court upheld the Sheet Metal Workers plan 
which had established a numerical goal of 25 percent for mi-
nority union membership and had appointed a monitor to en-
sure the defendant unions' conformance with the plan.104 The 
Court reasoned that the plan was necessary,105 flexible, 106 
645 F.2d 183, 200 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that consideration by the district court 
of other remedies to which plaintiff may have been entitled was necessary). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1995). 
101. Cox v. Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 221 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that injunc-
tion against a discriminatory practice not justified by a business necessity should 
apply to all potentially affected parties); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 
F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that district court properly enjoined discrim-
inatory employment practice not justified by a business necessity); Green v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that district 
court should enjoin employer practice found to have disparate impact on African-
Americans); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(holding that discriminatory practice must be enjoined if it is not justified by a 
business necessity). See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971). 
102. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Oppt'y 
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1986) (holding that affirmative action is the proper 
remedy for an employer's egregious and pervasive discrimination in violation of 
Title VII). 
103. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
104. Id. at 433. The affirmative action plan, as originally adopted by the dis-
trict court, 
required [the unions] to offer annual, nondiscriminatory 
journeyman and apprentice examinations, select members 
according to a white-nonwhite ratio to be negotiated by 
the parties, conduct extensive recruitment and publicity 
campaigns aimed at minorities, secure the administrator's 
consent before issuing temporary work permits, and main-
tain detailed membership records, including separate re-
cords for whites and nonwhites. 
Id. at 432-33. 
105. Initially, the Court noted that both lower courts had found affirmative 
15
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temporaryl07 and it did not impair the interests of white 
workers. lOS In addition, the Supreme Court determined that 
the Sheet Metal Workers plan met the defendant unions' consti-
tutional challenge because it survived strict scrutiny; the plan 
was narrowly tailored to promote the compelling government 
interest of remedy past discrimination. 109 
Similarly, in United States v. Paradise,110 the Supreme 
Court addressed the constitutionality of a court-ordered affir-
mative action plan. l1l The Paradise plan mandated the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety to promote one Mrican-
American trooper for every white trooper promoted until the 
percentage of Mrican-American troopers reached 25 per-
cent. 112 In determining the validity of the plan, the Court ar-
ticulated four factors similar to those used in Sheet Metal 
Workers: 113 (1) the plan's necessity and the effectiveness of 
other remedies,114 (2) its flexibility and duration,115 (3) the 
action necessary to cure the defendants' "pervasive and egregious discrimination." 
Id. at 476. Second, the Court stated that the district court had twice found the 
defendants in contempt for failing to comply with various parts of its remedial 
orders. Id. at 477. Moreover, as the district court had determined, the defendant 
union's reputation for discrimination dissuaded minorities from applying for union 
membership, thus an injunction would have been ineffective. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that affirmative action was necessary. Id. 
106. The Court reasoned that the plan's flexibility was evidenced by the district 
court having twice granted deadline extensions and continually allowing for various 
changes to the membership goal. Id. at 478. More importantly, the Court found 
that the district court had constructed the plan as a means of ensuring the 
defendants' compliance with its orders rather than as a "strict racial quota." Id. 
107. The numerical requirement that 25 percent of the union membership be 
minority workers terminated once that goal was reached, thus the Court deter-
mined that the plan was temporary in nature. Id. at 479. 
108. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479. 
109. Id. at 479-81. 
110. 480 U.S. 149 (1986). The National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People initiated the action against the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
because African-Americans were excluded from the state troopers. Id. at 154. 
111. Id. at 153. 
112. Id. The district court had issued the plan after eleven years of depart-
mental non-complian.::e with court orders. The district court had previously ordered 
the state to refrain from utilizing discriminatory practices against African-Ameri-
cans and to establish a non-discriminatory promotion procedure. Id. at 154-55. 
113. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. 
114. The Court noted that the district court had ordered the affirmative action 
plan to further three goals: First, to dissipate Alabama's discrimination against 
African-Americans; second, to ensure the state's compliance with the plan and 
third, to eliminate the effects of the state's prior delays. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 
16
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numerical goal's relation to the pertinent labor market, 116 
and (4) the burden such a goal may have on the rights of third 
parties. 117 The Supreme Court upheld the Paradise plan, con-
cluding that it not only met the above factors, but that it was 
also narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government pur-
pose and therefore constitutional.118 
Recently, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutional-
ity of federally imposed affirmative action plans in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 119 The Adarand petitioner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of federal set-aside provisions that 
are present in most federal contracts giving prime contractors 
a monetary incentive to hire subcontractors who had been 
certified socially or economically disadvantaged. 120 Without 
reviewing the merits of the case, the Court held that affirma-
tive action plans or programs imposed by any government 
actor, federal, state, or local, must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling governmental interest in order to survive a 
constitutional challenge. 121 Presently, therefore, all affirma-
tive action plans imposed by the government must meet the 
Adarand standard.122 
171-72. 
115. The Court found that the plan was flexible because it could be waived if 
there were no qualified African-Americans available and it was only applicable at 
the time promotions were made. In addition, the plan was temporary because it 
terminated once the state came up with a new promotion procedure that did not 
adversely impact African-American troopers. [d. at 177-78. 
116. The Court determined that since minority workers constituted 25 percent 
of the relevant labor force, the court-ordered 25 percent numerical goal properly 
reflected that figure. [d. at 179. Moreover, the Court noted that the district court 
had appropriately ordered this one-for-one requirement in light of the state's past 
conduct in failing to comply with the court's orders. [d. at 180-81. 
117. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. The Court found that the one-for-one require-
ment did not burden white workers because it was used only at the corporal rank 
and it did not require the termination of any white workers. Although the plan 
may have denied some white workers future employment, the Court held this was 
not· a substantial burden. [d. at 182-83. 
118. [d. at 167. 
119. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
120. [d. at 2102. For a brief discussion of the federal set-aside provisions at 
issue in Adarand, see David B. Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 
23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 944 (1996). 
121. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2113. 
122. [d. Professor Oppenheimer suggests that post-Adarand affirmative action 
plans must be remedial, flexible, waivable, temporary, and not burden the inter-
ests of white employees in order to meet the Adarand standard. Oppenheimer, 
17
Aholelei-Aonga: Affirmative Action
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
108 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:91 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties 
JATC, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court's Title VII 
remedial order for abuse of discretion. 123 The order had estab-
lished a gender-based selection system to the JATC's carpentry 
apprenticeship program. 124 The court reversed the district 
court's ruling, holding that the court below had abused its 
discretion in adopting a remedy which was not only unlawful, 
but also insufficient to remedy the JATC's past discrimination 
against female applicants. 125 Instead, the Circuit instructed 
the district court to adopt an affirmative action plan designed 
to repair the JATC's long-standing and systemic discrimina-
tion, after determining that the plan was permissible. 126 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRESCRIBED REMEDY WAS NEITHER 
NECESSARY NOR NARROWLY TAILORED TO REMEDY THE JATC's 
PAST DISCRIMINATION 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the district 
court had erred in adopting a two-track system that imposed 
separate gender-based standards on apprenticeship program 
applicants. 127 The two-track system had allowed female appli-
cants to enter the JATC's program without fulfilling the first-
job requirement, while male applicants were still required to 
obtain initial employment in the trade prior to admission. 128 
The Ninth Circuit noted that pursuant to Sheet Metal Work-
ers,129 Title VII remedies, at a minimum, must be narrowly 
tailored to remedy past discrimination. 130 
In determining the necessity of the two-track system, the 
supra note 120, at 946 (1996). 
123. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 
1996) ("Eldredge VI"). 
124. Id. at 1369. 
125. Id. at 1372. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1369. 
128. Eldredge VI, 94 F.2d at 1369. 
129. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Oppt'y 
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). See discussion supra part III.C. 
130. Id. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/8
1997] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 109 
court reviewed an opinion it had issued in a prior appeal. 131 
The court emphasized that it had clearly articulated that the 
principal problem with the JATC's admission process was the 
hunting license system because of the disparate impact it had 
on female applicants. 132 Therefore, the most reasonable solu-
tion, the court, noted would be to eliminate the hunting license 
system and to utilize the gender-neutral system that was al-
ready in place: the numerical referral list system.133 Thus, in 
the court's opinion, the adoption of the JATC's "mutilated ver-
sion" of the hunting license system was unnecessary. 134 
Furthermore, the court found that the JATC's proposed 
system was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimina-
tion by the JATC. 135 The court reasoned that, in fact, the 
JATC's plan worsened the situation for women in two 
ways.13G First, the plan denied female applicants on-the-job 
experience, the most important tool for their success in the 
carpentry trade.137 Second, the plan discouraged the JATC 
from actively recruiting and selecting female applicants be-
cause a major portion of the JATC's funding came froni em-
ployer contributions made according to the hours worked by 
the JATC apprentices. 13S Therefore, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the plan did not meet the minimal requirements of 
Sheet Metal Workers because it was neither necessary nor 
narrowly tailored to rectify the JATC's past discrimination.139 
131. Id. The court reviewed its opinion issued in Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. 
Cal. Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 
(1988) ("Eldredge IV"). 
132. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369. In Eldredge N, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the hunting license system had had a disparate impact on female applicants and 
remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Class 
based on the JATC's use of the system. Eldredge N, 833 F.2d at 1341. 
133. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369. 
134. Id. at 1369. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. The Plaintiff Class alleged that the plan adopted by the district court 
had, in fact, disadvantaged female applicants by not providing them with the legit-
imacy that the hunting license communicates to potential employers. The Plaintiff 
Class claimed that the hunting license impliedly certified that its holder has been 
deemed qualified by the JATC. Appellants' Opening Brief at 24, n.28, Eldredge v. 
Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93· 
16925). 
138. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369. 
139. Id. 
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More importantly, the court found that the plan was "unlawful, 
inadequate and contrary" to the principles it had set forth in 
its prior opinion. 14O The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that 
the district court had abused its discretion in adopting the 
JATC's proposal. 141 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ADOPT AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN PROPOSED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF CLASS 
The Ninth Circuit next determined the validity of the 
remedies proposed by the Plaintiff Class, including an affirma-
tive action plan. 142 The court reviewed the three major com-
ponents of the proposal submitted by the Plaintiff Class to 
determine whether the district court had abused its discretion 
in refusing to adopt it instead of the JATC's two-track sys-
tem. l43 Subsequent to its review, the court concluded that the 
district court had erred in not requiring, among other things, 
an affirmative action plan to dissipate the effects of discrimina-
tion.l44 
1. The District Court Had Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to 
Enjoin Use of the Hunting License System and in Refusing to 
Order Use of the Numerical Referral List System 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in 
refusing to enjoin further use of the hunting license system 
since this system had been the primary cause of the disparate 
impact against women. l45 Again referring to its earlier opin-
ion, the court noted that it could not have been "more explicit" 
in pointing out the disparities caused by this system. l46 Thus, 
the court held that elimination of the hunting license system 
140. Id. at 1367. Again, the court was referring to its opinion in Eldredge N, 
discussed supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
141. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369. 
142. Id. at 1369-72. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1369-72. 
145. Id. at 1369. 
146. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court was again referring to its earlier 
decision in Eldredge N. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
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was required because the JATC had not shown that the system 
was justified by a business necessity.147 . 
Next, the court considered whether the district court 
should have ordered the JATC to use only the numerical refer-
ral list system in assigning all applicants to their first job. l4B 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district was both authorized 
and obligated to issue an order that would eliminate the effects 
of past discrimination and prevent discrimination in the fu-
ture.149 The issue before the court, therefore, was whether it 
was within the discretionary authority of the district court to 
order the JATC to use only the numerical referral list sys-
tem. 1SO 
In addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the 
gender-neutral nature of the numerical referral list system, 
noting that job referrals are made according to the applicant's 
rank on the list rather than according to gender. 151 Moreover, 
the court found that the numerical referral list system allowed 
female applicants to compete on equal footing with male appli-
cants because employers would no longer be able to pick only 
male applicants as had been the case under the hunting li-
cense system. 152 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the JATC's contention 
that the limitations on employers' discretion in the selection of 
its apprentices would result in employers refraining from re-
147. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
148. Id. The district court had characterized the adoption of the numerical 
referral list system without the hunting license system as a completely new proce-
dure that would impinge on the employers' discretion to hire its own apprentices. 
The district court had also stated that formulation of a remedy to facilitate female 
applicants' admission to the JATC's program should not create havoc for 4,500 
potential employers and 60 unions. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 11, 
Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 9, 1993). 
149. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court stated that to remedy a Title VII 
violation the district court "has not merely the power but the duty to render a 
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past 
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
150. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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questing JATC apprentices. 153 The court responded that the 
numerical referral list system had been used intermittently by 
employers without objection during the score of years that it 
had existed.154 Despite the JATC's assertion that the numeri-
cal referral list system would burden employers, JATC's own 
board member admitted that he had never spoken with an 
employer who had hired an apprentice through the numerical 
referral list system.155 The court stated that employers would 
still have the option of not employing an apprentice for any 
legitimate reason. 156 Moreover, the court noted that there 
was an economic incentive for employers to use the JATC's 
beginning apprentices since they are paid substantially less 
than journeymen carpenters.157 The court concluded that the 
district court had abused its discretion in failing to order the 
JATC to use only the numerical referral list system in its ap-
prenticeship program. 158 
2. Adoption of Aflirmative Action Would Remedy Past 
Discrimination· 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had 
abused its discretion in refusing to adopt the affirmative action 
plan proposed by the Plaintiff Class.159 The affirmative action 
plan set a twenty percent admission rate for female applicants 
which would terminate once female apprentices constitute 
twenty percent of all apprentices in the JATC's program.160 
Referring to Sheet Metal Workers, the court stated that an 
affirmative action plan may be "appropriate where an employ-
er or labor union has engaged in persistent or egregious dis-
crimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering ef-
153. Id. The district court had stated that use of the numerical referral list 
system would deprive employers of any discretion in choosing their own employees 
and it presupposed that employers would call in blind for untrained and inexperi-
enced apprentices. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 11, Eldredge v. Carpenters 
46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1993. 
154. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
·157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370-72. 
160. Id. at 1370. 
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fects of pervasive discrimination."161 Similarly, with reference 
to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,162 the Ninth Circuit 
noted that federal courts may require remedial affirmative 
action plans where an employer's conduct has been "pervasive, 
systematic, and obstinate."I63 
The court then reviewed the JATC's conduct over the 
course of the litigation. l64 Initially, noting that the JATC's 
reliance on the hunting license system had effectively excluded 
women from the carpentry trade during the life of the case, the 
court was not surprised that women accounted for only five 
percent of the JATC's applicant pool.165 The court found that 
female applicants had consistently represented less than three 
percent of all applicants admitted and that male applicants 
had had a significant advantage over female applicants. 166 
Thus, the court concluded that the JATC's conduct had been 
both obstinate and egregious. because the JATC had, in the 
court's opinion, continued its legal battle to preserve the status 
quo. 167 
Next, the court examined the appropriateness of the affir-
mative action plan under the standards set forth by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Paradise. l68 Under Paradise, 
a court-ordered affirmative action plan must be analyzed under 
four factors: its necessity and the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies, its flexibility and temporary nature, including waiver 
provisions, the propriety of the numerical goal's relationship to 
the relevant labor market, and the its incidental burden on the 
161. Id. (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 445). 
162. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). See discussion 
supra part III.C. 
163. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. Specifically, the court stated, "[t]he bottom line is that women histori-
cally have been systematically excluded from carpentry work and for more than 
two decades have sought relief through the courts while the JATC, the craft's 
gatekeeping organization, has waged a relentless battle to preserve the status 
quo." Id. 
168. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court referred to the Supreme Court's 
opinion in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) discussed supra part 
III.C. 
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rights of third parties. 169 
To determine the necessity of the affirmative action plan, 
the court reviewed the JATC's past conduct. 17o Citing to sta-
tistics as well as the JATC's own failure to facilitate female 
applicants' admission into the apprenticeship program, the 
court concluded that the plan was necessary to remedy the 
JATC's past discrimination against women.17l In so conclud-
ing, the Ninth Circuit characterized the JATC's conduct as 
recalcitrant foot-dragging. 172 
The court then considered whether the proposed plan was 
flexible and temporary as required by Sheet Metal Workers. 173 
First, the court noted that the plan terminated on its own 
terms once women comprised twenty percent of the program's 
indentured apprentices. 174 Second, the court stated that the 
JATC need only make reasonable efforts to recruit more female 
applicants should the JATC's present applicant pool prove 
insufficient to satisfy the numerical goal. 175 More important-
ly, the court noted that the numerical goal met the Sheet Metal 
Workers standard because it only set a benchmark against 
which the court could gauge the JATC's efforts. 176 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether there 
was a proper nexus between the numerical goal and the car-
pentry labor market. 177 Referring to the guidelines issued by 
the United States Department of Labor,178 the court found 
169. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1371. 
170. Id. at 1371-72. 
171. Id. at 1372. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 1371. 
174. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. With respect to equal opportunities in apprenticeship and training pro-
grams, the United States Dept. of Labor Guidelines provides: 
[I]n order to deal fairly with program sponsors, and with 
women who are entitled to protection under the goals and 
timetables requirements, during the first 12 months after 
the effective date of these regulations, the program spon-
sor would generally be expected to set a goal for women 
for the entering year class at a rate which is not less 
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that the numerical goal proposed by the Plaintiff Class was 
proper since it was a conservative estimate.179 Thereafter, the 
court determined that the numerical goal would not unduly 
burden male applicants ·Cas third parties) since both male and 
female applicants still had to meet minimal admission require-
ments. 180 So, qualified men would not be passed over for un-
qualified women. l8l Moreover, the numerical goal did not re-
quire the expulsion of any male apprentices already in the 
program, although it may delay the admittance of potential 
male apprentices. 182 The court concluded that the affirmative 
action plan, with its numerical goal, was permissible and held 
that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing to 
adopt it. 183 
3. Egregious and Obstinate Conduct Necessitated a Court-
appointed Monitor 
The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the district court's 
refusal to appoint a monitor.l84 The court alluded to the 
JATC's persistence in refusing to facilitate the admission of 
women to its apprenticeship program, specifically, that 
throughout the litigation, the JATC had done everything in its 
power to exclude women from the program. l85 Under the cir-
cumstances, the court concluded that a monitor was necessary 
and the district court had abused its discretion in declining to 
appoint one. 186 
than 50 percent of the proportion women are of the 
workforce in the program sponsor's labor market area and 
set a percentage goal for women in each class beyond the 
entering class which is not less than the participation 
rate of women currently in the preceding class. 
29 C.F.R. § 30.4(0 (1996). 
179. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's adoption of a gender-
based remedy as illegal and insufficient to remedy the JATC's 
past discrimination against women. 187 The court held that 
the proper remedy in the case of long-standing and egregious 
discrimination was an affirmative action plan to encourage and 
expedite the admission of women into the JATC's apprentice-
ship program. l88 In addition, the court determined that elimi-
nation of the discriminatory practice was reqUired since it was 
not necessary to job performance.189 Moreover, the court de-
termined that a court-appointed monitor was necessary to 
administer the plan and ensure the JATC's compliance. 19o In 
so doing, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling which endorsed a 
gender-conscious selection process amidst growing opposition 
to affirmative action plans191 and pounded what may be the 
last nail into over two decades of litigation between the par-
ties. 
Unaloto-ki-Vahanoa Halamehi Aholelei-Aonga· 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1369-72. 
189. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. 
190. Id. at 1372. 
191. See Rinat Fried, Preference Plan Carved Out for Union's Hiring, THE RE-
CORDER, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1. 
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